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The Social
Organization THE late
Professor Fiske, in his Outlines of
Cosmic Philosophy, made a very interesting remark about societies like
those of China, ancient Egypt, and ancient Assyria. "I am expressing,” he
said, "something more than an analogy, I am describing a real homology so
far as concerns the process of development, — when I say that these communities
simulated modern European nations, much in the same way that a tree-fern of the
carboniferous period simulated the exogenous trees of the present time.” So far
as this is true of China, it is likewise true of Japan. The constitution of the
old Japanese society was no more than an amplification of the constitution of
the family, — the patriarchal family of primitive times. All modern Western
societies have been developed out of a like patriarchal condition: the early
civilizations of Greece and Rome were similarly constructed, upon a lesser
scale. But the patriarchal family in Europe was disintegrated thousands of
years ago; the gens and the curia dissolved and disappeared; the originally
distinct classes became fused together; and a total reorganization of society
was gradually effected, everywhere resulting in the substitution of voluntary
for compulsory cooperation. Industrial types of society developed; and a
state-religion overshadowed the ancient and exclusive local cults. But society
in Japan never, till within the present era, became one coherent body, never
developed beyond the clan-stage. It remained a loose agglomerate of
clan-groups, or tribes, each religiously and administratively independent of
the rest; and this huge agglomerate was kept together, not by voluntary cooperation,
but by strong compulsion. Down to the period of Meiji, and even for some time
afterward, it was liable to split and fall asunder at any moment that the
central coercive power showed signs of weakness. We may call it a feudalism; but
it resembled European feudalism only as a tree-fern resembles a tree. Let us
first briefly consider the nature of the ancient Japanese society. Its original
unit was not the household, but the patriarchal family, — that is to say, the
gens or clan, a body of hundreds or thousands of persons claiming descent from
a common ancestor, and so religiously united by a common ancestor-worship, — the
cult of the Ujigami. As I have said before, there were two classes of these patriarchal
families: the Ō-uji, or Great Clans; and the Ko-uji, or Little Clans. The
lesser were branches of the greater, and subordinate to them, — so that the
group formed by an Ō-uji with its Ko-uji might be loosely compared with the Roman
curia or Greek phratry. Large bodies of serfs or slaves appear to have been
attached to the various great Uji; and the number of these, even at a very
early period, seems to have exceeded that of the members of the clans proper.
The different names given to these subject-classes indicate different grades
and kinds of servitude. One name was tomobé,
signifying bound to a place, or district; another was yakabé, signifying bound to a family; a third was kakibé, signifying bound to a close, or estate;
yet another and more general term was tami,
which anciently signified "dependants," but is now used in the
meaning of the English word "folk."... There is little doubt that the
bulk of the people were in a condition of servitude, and that there were many
forms of servitude. Mr. Spencer has pointed out that a general distinction between
slavery and serfdom, in the sense commonly attached to each of those terms, is
by no means easy to establish; the real state of a subject-class, especially in
early forms of society, depending much more upon the character of the master,
and the actual conditions of social development, than upon matters of privilege
and legislation. In speaking of early Japanese institutions, the distinction is
particularly hard to draw: we are still but little informed as to the condition
of the subject classes in ancient times. It is safe to assert, however, that
there were then really but two great classes, — a ruling oligarchy, divided
into many grades; and a subject population, also divided into many grades.
Slaves were tattooed, either on the face or some part of the body, with a mark
indicating their ownership. Until within recent years this system of tattooing
appears to have been maintained in the province of Satsuma, — where the marks were
put especially upon the hands; and in many other provinces the lower classes
were generally marked by a tattoo on the face. Slaves were bought and sold like
cattle in early times, or presented as tribute by their owners, — a practice
constantly referred to in the ancient records. Their unions were not recognized:
a fact which reminds us of the distinction among the Romans between connubium and contubernium; and the children of a slave-mother by a free father
remained slaves.1 In the seventh century, however, private slaves
were declared state-property, and great numbers were then emancipated, — including
nearly all — probably all who were artizans or followed useful callings. Gradually
a large class of freedmen came into existence; but until modern times the great
mass of the common people appear to have remained in a condition analogous to
serfdom. The greater number certainly had no family names, which is considered evidence
of a former slave-condition. Slaves proper were registered in the names of
their owners: they do not seem to have had a cult of their own, — in early
times, at least. But, prior to Meiji, only the aristocracy, samurai, doctors,
and teachers — with perhaps a few other exceptions — could use a family name.
Another queer bit of evidence on the subject, furnished by the late Dr.
Simmons, relates to the mode of wearing the hair among the subject-classes. Up
to the time of the Ashikaga shōgunate (1334 A.D.), all classes excepting the nobility,
samurai, Shinto priests, and doctors, shaved the greater part of the head, and
wore queues; and this fashion of wearing the hair was called yakko-atama or dorei-atama — terms signifying "slave-head," and
indicating that the fashion originated in a period of servitude. About the
origin of Japanese slavery, much remains to be learned. There are evidences of
successive immigrations; and it is possible that some, at least, of the earlier
Japanese settlers were reduced by later invaders to the status of servitude.
Again, there was a considerable immigration of Koreans and Chinese, some of
whom might have voluntarily sought servitude as a refuge from worse evils. But the
subject remains obscure. We know, however, that degradation to slavery was a
common punishment in early times; also, that debtors unable to pay became the
slaves of their creditors; also, that thieves were sentenced to become the
slaves of those whom they had robbed.2 Evidently there were great
differences in the conditions of servitude. The more unfortunate class of
slaves were scarcely better off than domestic animals; but there were serfs who
could not be bought or sold, nor employed at other than special work; these
were of kin to their lords, and may have entered voluntarily into servitude for
the sake of sustenance and protection. Their relation to their masters reminds us
of that of the Roman client to the Roman patron. As yet it
is difficult to establish any clear distinction between the freedmen and the
freemen of ancient Japanese society; but we know that the free population,
ranking below the ruling class, consisted of two great divisions: the kunitsuko and the tomonotsuko. The first were farmers, descendants perhaps of the
earliest Mongol invaders, and were permitted to hold their own lands
independently of the central government: they were lords of their own soil, but
not nobles. The tomonotsuko were artizans, probably of Korean or Chinese descent,
for the most part, and numbered no less than 180 clans. They followed
hereditary occupations; and their clans were attached to the imperial clans,
for which they were required to furnish skilled labour. Originally
each of the Ō-uji and Ko-uji had its own territory, chiefs, dependants, serfs,
and slaves. The chieftainships were hereditary, — descending from father to son
in direct succession from the original patriarch. The chief of a great clan was
lord over the chiefs of the sub-clans attached to it: his authority was both
religious and military. It must not be forgotten that religion and government were
considered identical. All
Japanese clan-families were classed under three heads, — Kōbétsu, Shinobétsu, and Bambétsu. The Kōbétsu ("Imperial Branch") represented the so-called
imperial families, claiming descent from the Sun-goddess; the Shinobétsu ("Divine Branch") were
clans claiming descent from other deities, terrestrial or celestial; the Bambétsu ("Foreign Branch")
represented the mass of the people. Thus it would seem that, by the ruling
classes, the common people were originally considered strangers, — Japanese
only by adoption. Some scholars think that the term Bambétsu was at first given to serfs or freedmen of Chinese or
Korean descent. But this has not been proved. It is only certain that all society
was divided into three classes, according to ancestry; that two of these
classes constituted a ruling oligarchy;3 and that the third, or
"foreign" class represented the bulk of the nation, — the plebs. There was a division also into
castes kabané or sei. (I use the term "castes," following Dr. Florenz, a
leading authority on ancient Japanese civilization, who gives the meaning of
sei as equivalent to that of the Sanscrit varna,
signifying "caste" or "colour.") Every family in the three
great divisions of Japanese society belonged to some caste; and each caste
represented at first some occupation or calling. Caste would not seem to have
developed any very rigid structure in Japan; and there were early tendencies to
a confusion of the kabané. In the seventh century the confusion became so great
that the Emperor Temmu thought it necessary to reorganize the set; and by him
all the clan-families were regrouped into eight new castes. Such was
the primal constitution of Japanese society; and that society was, therefore,
in no true sense of the term, a fully formed nation. Nor can the title of
Emperor be correctly applied to its early rulers. The German scholar, Dr.
Florenz, was the first to establish these facts, contrary to the assumption of
Japanese historians. He has shown that the "heavenly sovereign" of
the early ages was the hereditary chief of one Uji only, — which Uji, being the
most powerful of all, exercised influence over many of the others. The
authority of the “heavenly sovereign" did not extend over the country. But
though not even a king, — outside of his own large group of patriarchal
families, — he enjoyed three immense prerogatives. The first was the right of representing
the different Uji before the common ancestral deity, — which implies the
privileges and powers of a high priest. The second was the right of
representing the different Uji in foreign relations: that is to say, he could
make peace or declare war in the name of all the clans, and therefore exercised
the supreme military authority. His third prerogative included the right to
settle disputes between clans; the right to nominate a clan-patriarch, in case
that the line of direct succession to the chieftainship of any Uji came to an
end; the right to establish new Uji; and the right to abolish an Uji guilty of
so acting as to endanger the welfare of the rest. He was, therefore, Supreme
Pontiff, Supreme Military Commander, Supreme Arbitrator, and Supreme
Magistrate. But he was not yet supreme king: his powers were exercised only by
consent of the clans. Later he was to become the Great Khan in very fact, and
even much more, — the Priest-Ruler, the God-King, the Deity-Incarnate. But with
the growth of his dominion, it became more and more difficult for him to
exercise all the functions originally combined in his authority; and, as a
consequence of deputing those functions, his temporal sway was doomed to
decline, even while his religious power continued to augment. The
earliest Japanese society was not, therefore, even a feudalism in the meaning
which we commonly attach to that word: it was a union of clans at first
combined for defence and offence, — each clan having a religion of its own.
Gradually one clan-group, by power of wealth and numbers, obtained such
domination that it was able to impose its cult upon all the rest, and to make
its hereditary chief Supreme High Pontiff. The worship of the Sun-goddess so
became a race-cult; but this worship did not diminish the relative importance
of the other clan-cults, — it only furnished them with a common tradition.
Eventually a nation formed; but the clan remained the real unit of society; and
not until the present era of Meiji was its disintegration effected — at least
in so far as legislation could accomplish. We may
call that period during which the clans became really united under one head,
and the national cult was established, the First Period of Japanese Social
Evolution. However, the social organism did not develop to the limit of its
type until the era of the Tokugawa shōguns, — so that, in order to study it as
a completed structure, we must turn to modern times. Yet it had taken on the vague
outline of its destined form as early as the reign of the Emperor Temmu, whose
accession is generally dated 673 A.D. During that reign Buddhism appears to
have become a powerful influence at court; for the Emperor practically imposed a
vegetarian diet upon the people — proof positive of supreme power in fact as
well as in theory. Even before this time society had been arranged into ranks
and grades, — each of the upper grades being distinguished by the form and
quality of the official head-dresses worn; but the Emperor Temmu established many
new grades, and reorganized the whole administration, after the Chinese manner,
in one hundred and eight departments. Japanese society then assumed, as to its
upper ranks, nearly all the hierarchical forms which it presented down to the
era of the Tokugawa shōguns, who consolidated the system without seriously
changing its fundamental structure. We may say that from the close of the First
Period of its social evolution, the nation remained practically separated into
two classes: the governing class, including all orders of the nobility and
military; and the producing class, comprising all the rest. The chief event of
the Second Period of the social evolution was the rise of the military power,
which left the imperial religious authority intact, but usurped all the
administrative functions — (this subject will be considered in a later
chapter). The society eventually crystallized by this military power was a very
complex structure — outwardly resembling a huge feudalism, as we understand the
term, but intrinsically different from any European feudalism that ever
existed. The difference lay especially in the religious organization of the
Japanese communities, each of which, retaining its particular cult and
patriarchal administration, remained essentially separate from every other. The
national cult was a bond of tradition, not of cohesion: there was no religious
unity. Buddhism, though widely accepted, brought no real change into this order
of things; for, whatever Buddhist creed a commune might profess, the real
social bond remained the bond of the Ujigami. So that, even as fully developed under
the Tokugawa rule, Japanese society was still but a great aggregate of clans
and sub-clans, kept together by military coercion. At the
head of this vast aggregate was the Heavenly Sovereign, the Living God of the
race, — Priest-Emperor and Pontiff Supreme, — representing the oldest dynasty
in the world. Next to
him stood the Kugé, or ancient nobility, — descendants of emperors and of gods.
There were, in the time of the Tokugawa, 155 families of this high nobility.
One of these, the Nakatomi, held, and still holds, the highest hereditary
priesthood: the Nakatomi were, under the Emperor, the chiefs of the ancestral
cult. All the great clans of early Japanese history — such as the Fujiwara, the
Taira, the Minamoto — were Kugé; and most of the great regents and shōguns of
later history were either Kugé or descendants of Kugé. Next to
the Kugé ranked the Buké, or military class, — also called Monofufu, Wasarau,
or Samurahi (according to the ancient writing of these names), — with an
extensive hierarchy of its own. But the difference, in most cases, between the
lords and the warriors of the Buké was a difference of rank based upon income
and title: all alike were samurai, and nearly all were of Kōbétsu or Shinbétsu
descent. In early times the head of the military class was appointed by the
Emperor, only as a temporary commander-in-chief: afterwards, these commanders-in-chief,
by usurpation of power, made their office hereditary, and became veritable imperatores, in the Roman sense. Their
title of shōgun is well known to
Western readers. The shōgun ruled over between two and three hundred lords of
provinces or districts, whose powers and privileges varied according to income
and grade. Under the Tokugawa shōgunate there were 292 of these lords, or
daimyo. Before that time each lord exercised supreme rule over his own domain; and
it is not surprising that the Jesuit missionaries, as well as the early Dutch and
English traders should have called the daimyō "kings." The despotism
of the daimyō was first checked by the founders of the Tokugawa dynasty, Iyéyasu,
who so restricted their powers that they became, with some exceptions, liable
to lose their estates if proved guilty of oppression and cruelty. He ranked
them all in four great classes: (1) Sanké,
or Go-Sanké, the "Three Exalted
Families" (those from whom a successor to the shōgunate might be chosen in
case of need); (2) Kokushū, "Lords
of Provinces"; (3) Tozama,
"Outside-Lords"; (4) Fudai,
"Successful Families": a name given to those families promoted to
lordship or otherwise rewarded for fealty to Iyéyasu. Of the Sanké, there were
three clans, or families: of the Kokushū, eighteen; of the Tozama, eighty-six; and
of the Fudai, one hundred and seventy-six. The income of the least of these
daimyō was 10,000 koku of rice (we
may say about Ł10,000, though the value of the koku differed greatly at different periods); and the income of the
greatest, the Lord of Kaga, was estimated at 1,027,000 koku. The great
daimyō had their greater and lesser vassals; and each of these, again, had his
force of trained samurai, or fighting gentry. There was also a particular class
of soldier-farmers, called gōshi, some
of whom possessed privileges and powers exceeding those of the lesser daimyō. These gōshi, who were independent landowners, for the most part, formed a
kind of yeomanry; but there were many points of difference between the social
position of the gōshi and that of the
English yeomen. Besides
reorganizing the military class, Iyéyasu created several new subclasses. The
more important of these were the hatamoto
and the gokénin. The hatamoto, whose
appellation signifies “banner-supporters," numbered about 2000, and the
gokénin about 5000. These two bodies of samurai formed the special military
force of the shōgun; the hatamoto being greater vassals, with large incomes; and
the gokénin lesser vassals, with small incomes, who ranked above other common
samurai only because of being directly attached to the shōgun's service.... The
total number of samurai of all grades was about 2,000,000. They were exempted from
taxation, and privileged to wear two swords. Such, in
brief outline, was the general ordination of those noble and military classes
by whom the nation was ruled with great severity. The bulk of the common people
were divided into three classes (we might even say castes, but for Indian ideas
long associated with the term): Farmers, Artizans, and Merchants. Of these
three classes, the farmers (hyakushō)
were the highest; ranking immediately after the samurai. Indeed, it is hard to
draw a line between the samurai-class and the farming-class, — because many
samurai were farmers also, and because some farmers held a rank considerably
above that of ordinary samurai. Perhaps we should limit the term hyakushō (farmers, or peasantry) to
those tillers of the soil who lived only by agriculture, and were neither of Kobétsu nor Shimbéttsu descent.... At all events, the occupation of the peasant
was considered honourable: a farmer's daughter might become a servant in the imperial
household itself — though she could occupy only an humble position in the
service. Certain farmers were privileged to wear swords. It appears that in the
early ages of Japanese society there was no distinction between farmers and
warriors: all able-bodied farmers were then trained fighting-men, ready for war
at any moment, — a condition paralleled in old Scandinavian society. After a
special military class had been evolved, the distinction between farmer and
samurai still remained vague in certain parts of the country. In Satsuma and in
Tosa, for example, the samurai continued to farm down to the present era: the
best of the Kyūshū samurai were nearly all farmers; and their superior stature
and strength were commonly attributed to their rustic occupations. In other
parts of the country, as in Izumo, farming was forbidden to samurai they were
not even allowed to hold rice-land, though they might own forest-land. But in
various provinces they were permitted to farm, even while strictly forbidden to
follow any other occupation, — any trade or craft.... At no time did any
degradation attach to the pursuit of agriculture. Some of the early emperors
took a personal interest in farming; and in the grounds of the Imperial Palace
at Akasaka may even now be seen a little rice-field. By religious tradition,
immemorially old, the first sheaf of rice grown within the imperial grounds
should be reaped and offered by the imperial hand to the divine ancestors as a
harvest offering, on the occasion of the Ninth Festival, Shin-Shō-Sai.4
Below the
peasantry ranked the artizan-class (Shōkunin) including smiths, carpenters,
weavers, potters, all crafts, in short. Highest among these were reckoned, as
we might expect, the sword-smiths. Sword-smiths not infrequently rose to
dignities far beyond their class: some had conferred upon them the high title
of Kami, written with the same character
used in the title of a daimyo, who was usually termed the Kami of his province or district. Naturally they enjoyed the
patronage of the highest, — emperors and Kugé. The Emperor Go-Toba is known to
have worked at sword-making in a smithy of his own. Religious rites were
practised during the forging of a blade down to modern times.... All the
principal crafts had guilds; and, as a general rule, trades were hereditary.
There are good historical grounds for supposing that the ancestors of the
Shōkunin were mostly Koreans and Chinese. The
commercial class (Akindō), including
bankers, merchants, shopkeepers, and traders of all kinds, was the lowest officially
recognized. The business of money-making was held in contempt by the superior classes;
and all methods of profiting by the purchase and re-sale of the produce of
labour were regarded as dishonourable. A military aristocracy would naturally
look down upon the trading-classes; and there is generally, in militant
societies, small respect for the common forms of labour. But in Old Japan the
occupations of the farmer and the artizan were not despised: trade alone
appears to have been considered degrading, — and the discrimination may have
been partly a moral one. The relegation of the mercantile class to the lowest
place in the social scale must have produced some curious results. However
rich, for example, a rice-dealer might be, he ranked below the carpenters or
potters or boat-builders whom he might employ, — unless it happened that his
family originally belonged to another class. In later times the Akindō included
many persons of other than Akindō descent; and the class thus virtually
retrieved itself. Of the
four great classes of the nation — Samurai, Farmers, Artizans, and Merchants
(the Shi-No-Ko-Shō, as they were
briefly called, after the initial characters of the Chinese terms used to
designate them) — the last three were counted together under the general
appellation of Heimin, “common
folk." All heimin were subject to the samurai; any samurai being
privileged to kill the heimin showing him disrespect. But the heimin were
actually the nation: they alone created the wealth of the country, produced the
revenues, paid the taxes, supported the nobility and military and clergy. As
for the clergy, the Buddhist (like the Shinto) priests, though forming a class
apart, ranked with the samurai, not with the heimin. Outside
of the three classes of commoners, and hopelessly below the lowest of them,
large classes of persons existed who were not reckoned as Japanese, and
scarcely accounted human beings. Officially they were mentioned genetically as chōri, and were counted with the
peculiar numerals used in counting animals: ippiki, nihiki, samhiki, etc. Even
to-day they are commonly referred to, not as persons (hito) but as "things" (mono). To English readers (chiefly through Mr. Mitford's yet
unrivalled Tales of Old Japan) they
are known as Ėta; but their
appellations varied according to their callings. They were pariah-people: Japanese
writers have denied, upon apparently good grounds, that the chōri belong to the Japanese race.
Various tribes of these outcasts followed occupations in the monopoly of which
they were legally confirmed: they were well-diggers, garden-sweepers,
straw-workers, sandal-makers, according to local privileges. One class was
employed officially in the capacity of torturers and executioners; another was
employed as night-watchmen; a third as grave-makers. But most of the Ėta
followed the business of tanners and leather-dressers. They alone had the right
to slaughter and flay animals, to prepare various kinds of leather, and to manufacture
leather sandals, stirrup-straps, and drumheads, the making of drumheads — being
a lucrative occupation in a country where drums were used in a hundred thousand
temples. The Ėta had their own laws, and their own chiefs, who exercised powers
of life and death. They lived always in the suburbs or immediate neighbourhood
of towns, but only in separate settlements of their own. They could enter the town
to sell their wares, or to make purchases; but they could not enter any shop,
except the shop of a dealer in footgear.5 As professional singers
they were tolerated; but they were forbidden to enter any house — so they could
perform their music or sing their songs only in the street, or in a garden. Any
occupations other than their hereditary callings were strictly forbidden to
them. Between the lowest of the commercial classes and the Ėta, the barrier was
impassable as any created by caste-tradition in India; and never was Ghetto
more separated from the rest of a European city by walls and gates, than an Ėta
settlement from the rest of a Japanese town by social prejudice. No Japanese would
dream of entering an Ėta settlement unless obliged to do so in some official
capacity.... At the pretty little seaport of Mionoséki, I saw an Ėta
settlement, forming one termination of the crescent of streets extending round the
bay. Mionoséki is certainly one of the most ancient towns in Japan; and the Ėta
village attached to it must be very old. Even to-day, no Japanese habitant of
Mionoséki would think of walking through that settlement, though its streets
are continuations of the other streets: children never pass the unmarked
boundary; and the very dogs will not cross the prejudice-line. For all that the
settlement is clean, well built, — with gardens, baths, and temples of its own.
It looks like any well-kept Japanese village. But for perhaps a thousand years there
has been no fellowship between the people of those contiguous communities....
Nobody can now tell the history of these outcast folk: the cause of their
social excommunication has long been forgotten. Besides
the Ėta proper, there were pariahs called hinin,
— a name signifying "not-human-beings.” Under this appellation were
included professional mendicants, wandering minstrels, actors, certain classes
of prostitutes, and persons outlawed by society. The hinin had their own chiefs, and their own laws. Any person expelled
from a Japanese community might join the hinin;
but that signified good-by to the rest of humanity. The Government was too
shrewd to persecute the hinin. Their gipsy-existence
saved a world of trouble. It was unnecessary to keep petty offenders in jail,
or to provide for people incapable of earning an honest living, so long as
these could be driven into the hinin
class. There the incorrigible, the vagrant, the beggar, would be kept under
discipline of a sort, and would practically disappear from official cognizance.
The killing of a hinin was not
considered murder, and was punished only by a fine. The
reader should now be able to form an approximately correct idea of the
character of the old Japanese society. But the ordination of that society was much
more complex than I have been able to indicate, — so complex that volumes would
be required to treat the subject in detail. Once fully evolved, what we may
still call Feudal Japan, for want of a better name, presented most of the
features of a doubly-compound society of the militant type, with certain marked
approaches toward the trebly-compound type. A striking peculiarity, of course,
is the absence of a true ecclesiastical hierarchy, due to the fact that
Government never became dissociated from religion. There was at one time a
tendency on the part of Buddhism to establish a religious hierarchy — independent
of central authority; but there were two fatal obstacles in the way of such a
development. The first was the condition of Buddhism itself, — divided into a
number of sects, some bitterly opposed to others. The second obstacle was the implacable
hostility of the military clans, jealous of any religious power capable of
interfering, either directly or indirectly, with their policy. So soon as the
foreign religion began to prove itself formidable in the world of action,
ruthless measures were decided; and the frightful massacres of priests by Nobunaga,
in the sixteenth century, ended the political aspirations of Buddhism in Japan. Otherwise
the regimentation of society resembled that of all antique civilizations of the
militant type, — all action being both positively and negatively regulated. The
household ruled the person; the five-family group, the household; the
community, the group; the lord of the soil, the community; the Shōgun, the
lord. Over the whole body of the producing classes, two million samurai had
power of life and death; over these samurai the daimyō held a like power; and
the daimyō were subject to the Shōgun. Nominally the Shōgun was subject to the
Emperor, but not in fact: military usurpation disturbed and shifted the natural
order of the higher responsibility. However, from the nobility downwards, the
regulative discipline was much reinforced by this change in government. Among
the producing classes there were countless combinations — guilds of all sorts; but
these were only despotisms within despotisms — despotisms of the communistic
order; each member being governed by the will of the rest; and enterprise,
whether commercial or industrial, being impossible outside of some corporation....
We have already seen that the individual was bound to the commune — could not
leave it without a permit, could not marry out of it. We have seen also that the
stranger was a stranger in the old Greek and Roman sense, — that is to say an
enemy, a hostis, — and could enter
another community only by being religiously adopted into it. As regards
exclusiveness, therefore, the social conditions were like those of the early
European communities; but the militant conditions resembled rather those of the
great Asiatic empires. Of course
such a society had nothing in common with any modern form of Occidental
civilization. It was a huge mass of clan-groups, loosely united under a
duarchy, in which the military head was omnipotent, and the religious head only
an object of worship, — the living symbol of a cult. However this organization
might outwardly resemble what we are accustomed to call feudalism, its
structure was rather like that of ancient Egyptian or Peruvian society, — minus
the priestly hierarchy. The supreme figure is not an Emperor in our meaning of the
word, — not a king of kings and vicegerent of heaven, — but a God incarnate, a
race-divinity, an Inca descended from the Sun. About his sacred person, we see
the tribes ranged in obeisance, — each tribe, nevertheless, maintaining its own
ancestral cult; and the clans forming these tribes, and the communities forming
these clans, and the households forming these communities, have all their
separate cults; and out of the mass of these cults have been derived the
customs and the laws. Yet everywhere the customs and the laws differ more or
less, because of the variety of their origins: they have this only in common, —
that they exact the most humble and implicit obedience, and regulate every detail
of private and public life. Personality is wholly suppressed by coercion; and
the coercion is chiefly from within, not from without, — the life of every
individual being so ordered by the will of the rest as to render free action,
free speaking, or free thinking, out of the question. This means something
incomparably harsher than the socialistic tyranny of early Greek society: it
means religious communism doubled with a military despotism of the most
terrible kind. The individual did not legally exist, — except for punishment;
and from the whole of the producing-classes, whether serfs or freemen, the most
servile submission was ruthlessly exacted. It is
difficult to believe that any intelligent man of modern times could endure such
conditions and live (except under the protection of some powerful ruler, as in
the case of the English pilot Will Adams, created a samurai by Iyéyasu): the
incessant and multiform constraint upon mental and moral life would of itself
be enough to kill.... Those who write to-day about the extraordinary capacity
of the Japanese for organization, and about the "democratic spirit"
of the people as natural proof of their fitness for representative government in
the Western sense, mistake appearances for realities. The truth is that the
extraordinary capacity of the Japanese for communal organization, is the strongest
possible evidence of their unfitness for any modern democratic form of government.
Superficially the difference between Japanese social organization, and local
self-government in the modern American, or the English colonial meaning of the
term, appears slight; and we may justly admire the perfect self-discipline of a
Japanese community. But the real difference between the two is fundamental,
prodigious, measurable only by thousands of years. It is the difference between
compulsory and free cooperation the difference between the most despotic form
of communism, founded upon the most ancient form of religion, and the most
highly evolved form of industrial union, with unlimited individual right of
competition. There
exists a popular error to the effect that what we call communism and socialism
in Western civilization are modern growths, representing aspiration toward some
perfect form of democracy. As a matter of fact these movements represent
reversion, — reversion toward the primitive conditions of human society. Under
every form of ancient despotism we find exactly the same capacity of
self-government among the people: it was manifested by the old Egyptians and
Peruvians as well as by the early Greeks and Romans; it is exhibited to-day by Hindoo
and Chinese communities; it may be studied in Siamese or Annamese villages
quite as well as in Japan. It means a religious communistic despotism, — a
supreme social tyranny suppressing personality, forbidding enterprise, and
making competition a public offence. Such self-government also has its
advantages: it was perfectly adapted to the requirements of Japanese life so
long as the nation could remain isolated from the rest of the world. Yet it
must be obvious that any society whose ethical traditions forbid the individual
to profit at the cost of his fellow-men will be placed at an enormous
disadvantage when forced into the industrial struggle for existence against
communities whose self-government permits of the greatest possible personal
freedom, and the widest range of competitive enterprise. We might
suppose that perpetual and universal coercion, moral and physical, would have
brought about a state of universal sameness, — a dismal uniformity and monotony
in all life's manifestations. But such monotony existed only as to the life of the
commune, not as to that of the race. The most wonderful variety characterized
this quaint civilization, as it also characterized the old Greek civilization, and
for precisely the same reasons. In every patriarchal civilization ruled by
ancestor-worship, all tendency to absolute sameness, to general uniformity, is
prevented by the character of the aggregate itself, which never becomes homogeneous
and plastic. Every unit of that aggregate, each one of the multitude of petty
despotisms composing it, most jealously guards its own particular traditions and
customs, and remains self-sufficing. Hence results, sooner or later,
incomparable variety of detail, small detail, artistic, industrial,
architectural, mechanical. In Japan such differentiation and specialization was
thus maintained, that you will hardly find in the whole country even two
villages where the customs, industries, and methods of production are exactly
the same.... The customs of the fishing-villages will, perhaps, best illustrate
what I mean. In every coast district the various fishing-settlements have their
own traditional ways of constructing nets and boats, and their own particular
methods of handling them. Now, in the time of the great tidal-wave of 1896,
when thirty thousand people perished, and scores of coast-villages were
wrecked, large sums of money were collected in Kobé and elsewhere for the
benefit of the survivors; and well-meaning foreigners attempted to supply the
want of boats and fishing implements by purchasing quantities of locally made
nets and boats, and sending them to the afflicted districts. But it was found
that these presents were of no use to the men of the northern provinces, who
had been accustomed to boats and nets of a totally different kind; and it was
further discovered that every fishing-hamlet had special requirements of its
own in this regard.... Now the differentiations of habit and custom, thus exhibited
in the life of the fishing-communities, is paralleled in many crafts and
callings. The way of building houses, and of roofing them, differs in almost
every province; also the methods of agriculture and of horticulture, the manner
of making wells, the methods of weaving and lacquering and pottery-making and
tile-baking. Nearly every town and village of importance boasts of some special
production, bearing the name of the place, and unlike anything made elsewhere....
No doubt the ancestral cults helped to conserve and to develop such local
specialization of industries: the craft-ancestors, the patron-gods of the guild,
were supposed to desire that the work of their descendants and worshippers
should maintain a particular character of its own. Though individual enterprise
was checked by communal regulation, the specialization of local production was
encouraged by difference of cults. Family-conservatism or guild-conservatism would
tolerate small improvements or modifications suggested by local experience, but
would be wary, perhaps superstitious likewise, about accepting the resists of strange
experience. Still,
for the Japanese themselves, not the least pleasure of travel in Japan is the
pleasure of studying the curious variety in local production, — the pleasure of
finding the novel, the unexpected, the unimagined. Even those arts or
industries of Old Japan, primarily borrowed from Korea or from China, appear to
have developed and conserved innumerable queer forms under the influence of the
numberless local cults. 1 In the year 645, the Emperor Kotoku issued the following edict on the subject
— "The law of men and women shall be that the children born of a free man
and a free woman shall belong to the father; if a free man takes to wife a
slave-woman, her children shall belong to the mother; if a free woman marries a
slave-man, the children shall belong to the father; if they are slaves of two houses,
the children shall belong to the mother. The children of temple-serfs shall
follow the rule for freemen. But in regard to others who become slaves, they
shall be treated according to the rule for slaves." Aston's translation of
the Nihongi, Vol. II, p. 202. 2 An edict issued by the Empress Jitō, in 690, enacted that a father
could sell his son into real slavery; but that debtors could be sold only into
a kind of serfdom. The edict ran thus: "If a younger brother of the common
people is sold by his elder brother, he should be classed with freemen; if a
child is sold by his parents, he should be classed with slaves; persons
confiscated into slavery, by way of payment of interest on debts, are to be
classed with freemen; and their children, though born of a union with a slave,
are to be all classed with freemen." Aston's Nihongi,, Vol. II, p. 402. 3 Dr. Florenz accounts for the distinction between Kobétsu and Shinbétsu as due
to the existence of two military ruling classes, resulting from two successive waves
of invasion or immigration. The Kobétsu
were the followers of Jimmu Tenno; the Shinbétsu
were earlier conquerors who had settled in Yamato prior to the advent of Jimmu.
These first conquerors, he thinks, were not dispossessed. 4 At this festival the first new silk of the year, as well as the first
of the new rice-crop, is still offered to the Sun-goddess by the Emperor in
person. 5 This is still the rule in certain parts of the country. |